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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court Should Reject Appellee's Argument That Sanctions Are Justified 
Under Rule 24. 
This Court should refuse to sanction Appellant's brief because sanctions are not 
warranted under Utah law. Appellee argued that this Court should disregard or strike 
Appellant's brief because it cited to bound portions of the record submitted concurrently 
as an appendix to the brief, rather than record citations. But Utah courts have never 
stricken a brief solely because it lacked record citations. Appellants cited to State v. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah App. 1992) in support of its argument. In that case, however, 
the brief at issue in that case was "clearly deficient" in nearly every respect. In rejecting 
the Price brief, this Court reasoned that: 
The brief fails to set forth a coherent statement of issues and the appropriate 
standard of review for each issue with supporting authority. The quotes 
issues which are listed do not correlate with the substance of the brief. 
Defendants5 statement of the case not only omits reference to the course of 
proceedings and disposition of the trial court, but fails to provide a 
statement of the relevant facts properly documented by citations to the 
record. Defendants "argument" does not identify any error by the trial 
court, referred to the fact or record, or cite applicable authority, much less 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analysis. 
Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250. This Court concluded that the brief at issue was so deficient 
that it "[did] not enable us to locate errors in the record or demonstrate 'under applicable 
legal authorities' why the errors necessitate reversal." Id. at 250 (citing Demetropoulos v. 
Vreeken, 754 P.2d 960, 962 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied sub-nonu Rome v. 
Demetropoulos, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), with approval). 
Lack of record citations did not render Appellant's brief "clearly deficient." 
Appellees have made no showing that the lack of record citations warrants sanction under 
the authority it cited. To the contrary, in the Demetropoulos case1, this Court declined to 
impose Rule 24 sanctions even where this Court cataloged numerous deficiencies 
including "unhelpful citations to the thousand-plus page record," such as "See, pleading 
entitled Pre-Judgment Writ of Garnishment with Answers to Interrogatories dated April 
25, 1993, in the Court file," and, "See, entire Court file, + R169." 754 P.2d at 961. This 
Court declined to impose sanctions, and instead decided the appeal on the merits. 
Apart from record citations, Appellant's brief followed Rule 24 in every other 
respect. Like Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition, this is another meritless 
argument.2 While the briefs citations were made to an appendix of related relevant 
record materials, the brief (hopefully) enabled this Court to "understand . . . what 
particular errors were allegedly made, where in the record those errors can be found, and 
why, under the applicable authorities, those errors are material ones necessitating reversal 
or other relief" Demetropoulos, 754 P.2d at 962. This Court should reject Appellee's 
argument because it cited no authority to show that Rule 24 sanctions can be justified 
1
 Cited favorably by this Court in State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 250 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
2
 Appellant does not seek to excuse any of its Briefs shortcomings under 
Rule 24, but would urge this Court to focus on the real issues in this case rather than 
wasting its limited resources explaining why it must reject Appellee's argument for 
sanctions because it was not supported by legal precedent, or warranted under the facts of 
this case. 
2 
solely because the brief lacked citations to the record, especially where all record 
materials cited were concurrently submitted in an appendix. 
II. This Court Should Apply The Correction of Error Standard to Mr. 
Martinez's Appeal Because the Appeal Raises Questions of General Law and 
the Agencies' Decision Making or Procedure. 
The correction of error standard applies to Mr. Martinez's appeal because he 
appealed general legal questions and the Labor Commission's decision making process. 
Mr. Martinez's brief cited Questar Pipe Line Co. v. State Tax Commission, 817 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1991), to demonstrate that "correction of error" is the appropriate standard of 
review for Mr. Martinez's appeal. 
Mr. Martinez's appeal challenged the Commission's failure to consider the 
undisputed vocational evidence in denying his claim for permanent total disability 
benefits and failure to properly apply the statute and rules. Under the applicable statute, 
the Labor Commission must first determine whether Mr. Martinez's work injuries prevent 
him from performing prior work. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1 )(c)(iii) ["step III"]. 
Appellee's only vocational expert witness admitted that there was no work that Mr. 
Martinez could perform. Similarly, Mr. Martinez's expert witness also testified that there 
was no work he could perform. This evidence demonstrated that Mr. Martinez could not 
perform his past work under step III, or other work "reasonably available" under § 
413(l)(c)(iv)["step IV"]. The Order's failure to consider this evidence (much less weigh 
it) prevents this Court from performing a meaningful review of the steps the Commission 
took in denying Mr. Martinez's claims. 
3 
There is no marshalling requirement under the correction of error standard. 
Appellee argued that Mr. Martinez had a duty to marshal the evidence because it 
erroneously assumed that Mr. Martinez sought to "overturn the Commission's Findings." 
Appellee's Brief at 1, ^ 2 (quoting Whitear v. Labor Commission. 973 P.2d 982, 984 
(Utah Court App. 1998)). But its brief simply ignored the "correction of error" standard, 
and offered this Court no reason why it should substitute a "substantial evidence" 
standard to determine whether the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and/or 
abused its discretion in applying the facts to the statute and rule. 
Mr. Martinez had no duty to marshal the evidence because he has not sought to 
overturn the Commission's factual findings. Cf, Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 
982 (Utah 1998). Instead, Mr. Martinez's appeal attacks the process of the Commission's 
denial, and not merely its conclusions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b- 16(h). A review of the 
Order's purported "facts" is meaningless where the Commission failed to consider and 
evaluate material, dispositive evidence. Consequently, this Court must review the Order 
under a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the Commission's 
interpretations of general law, and should find that Mr. Martinez had no duty to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of his appeal. 
4 
III. This Court Should Find That The Labor Commission's Order Cannot Be 
Sustained Because It Failed To Consider Material Evidence, And Did Not 
Disclose The Steps It Took In Finding That Petitioner Could Perform 
Essential Functions Of A Fast Food Worker, And In The Process, Ignored 
The Plain Language Of The Statute And Rule. 
This Court should reverse the Commission's denial of Mr. Martinez's permanent 
total disability benefits because the Commission failed to consider material evidence 
regarding his inability to work, and because the Commission failed to follow the 
applicable statute and rules. Appellee's Brief simply ignored the applicable standard of 
review and urged this Court to affirm the denial under a substantial evidence standard. 
But this Court cannot affirm based on "substantial evidence" where the evidentiary 
process was fundamentally flawed. 
This Court should reverse and remand Mr. Martinez's case because the vocational 
evidence showed that there was no work he could perform. Both expert witnesses 
testified that there were no jobs that Mr. Martinez could perform, but the Commission 
found that Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of his job as a fast food 
worker. There was an insurmountable gap between the vocational evidence presented 
and the Order denying Mr. Martinez's claims. If the Commission discounted the 
testimony of both expert witnesses, the Order should have explained why. As it stands, 
however, the Order suggests that applicants who present undisputed expert vocational 
testimony that they can not work because of their industrial injuries, will nonetheless be 
5 
denied compensation.3 The Order's shortcomings show that the Labor Commission 
abused its discretion, contradicted the statute and its own rules/ and acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously. For these reasons, this Court should reverse the Commission's Order 
denying Mr. Martinez's benefits, and remand to the Commission for further findings 
consistent with this Court's Order. 
Respondent's gloss of the facts can not overcome the Commission's failure to 
consider and evaluate material evidence. The undisputed vocational evidence showed 
that there was no work Mr. Martinez could perform, but the Order concluded he could 
perform fast food work. Aplt. App. at 129. The vocational evidence also demonstrated 
that fast food work required the ability to use both hands. In contrast, the Order 
summarily concluded that Mr. Martinez could perform the essential functions of his work 
as a fast food worker, but made no findings about whether that those functions required 
the use of both hands. Applt. App. at 129. The Order also suggested that other work was 
reasonably available because "employers in the [fast food] industry [could] accommodate 
someone with limitations such as Mr. Martinez." Applt. App. at 129.5 But the standard is 
3
 Compare with Adams v. Labor Commission, 82IP.2d 1,7 (Utah App. 1991) 
(holding that mere conclusion that applicant failed to meet legal causation was arbitrary 




 Respondent's arguments about the Americans with Disabilities Act do not 
apply to permanent total disability claims under Utah law. See Appellee's Brief at 15-16. 
Like its standard of review and Rule 24 arguments, Respondent has failed to cite any 
authority as to why the ADA should apply to any permanent total disability claims under 
Utah law, much less Mr. Martinez's. This Court should reject Respondent's invitation 
6 
not whether employers can hypothetically modify or possibly tailor jobs to accommodate 
Mr. Martinez's limitations.6 Instead, the standard is whether work is "reasonably 
available/'7 defined as regular, steady and readily available.8 Only actual, existing jobs 
satisfy the standard. 
The Order can not be sustained because the Commission acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously be failing to consider and evaluate the consistent testimony of the vocational 
experts who opined that there were no jobs Mr. Martinez could perform. The Order also 
demonstrated that the Commission acted contrary to the statute and rules by using a 
standard of hypothetical work, rather than "reasonably available" work that is "regular, 
steady, and readily available." The Commission's finding that a hypothetical employer 
could accommodate Mr. Martinez's limitations is contrary to the statute and rule. 
and simply apply the appropriate Utah statute and rules. 
6
 This is consistent with § 413fs statutory framework. When an employee 
demonstrates that he can not return to his former job, and that no other jobs are 
"reasonably available" then he is "tentatively permanently totally disabled," and the 
burden shifts to the employer. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l). The employer then may 
pursue several options: 1) create a specially tailored job for the employee; 2) develop a re-
employment plan to train the employee for re-entry into the labor market; 3) locate 
appropriate part-time work; or, 4) pay benefits to the injured work. Id. at § 413(6). Given 
that the Act permits employers to create specially tailored jobs for tentatively permanently 
totally disabled employees, an employer's ability to specifically create a job can not be 
used as evidence that work is "reasonably available." 
7





This Court should grant Mr. Martinez's appeal because the Commission abused its 
discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it denied Mr. Martinez's claims. 
Both parties' vocational witnesses testified that there was no work that Mr. Martinez 
could perform. The Order did not consider or evaluate this evidence, and despite the 
evidence, concluded that Mr. Martinez could perform his old job as a fast food worker. 
The Order also concluded that work was "reasonably available" to Mr. Martinez because 
a hypothetical employer could possibly accommodate Mr. Martinez's limitations. But the 
Commission's own rules define "reasonably available" work as "regular, steady and 
readily available," and not hypothetical. This Court should find that the Commission 
abused its discretion, and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Mr. Martinez's 
claims. 
This Court should reverse the Order and find that Mr. Martinez could not perform 
his former work. Alternatively, this Court should remand the case to the Commission, 
and order it to consider the undisputed vocational evidence, and to properly apply the 
statute and rule to the evidence presented at the hearing. 
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DATED this 0 day of February, 2005. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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